WIELER vs. SCHILIZZI.

RECENT ENGLISH CASES.

.rn the Court of Common Pleas, January 15th, 1856.
WIELER VS. SCHILIZZL

I. In an action for a breach of warranty, by the vendee against the vendor of goods,
who has warranted them to be of a particular denomination, but not according to
sample, it is a proper question for the jury whether the amount of adulteration in
the goods supplied, be such as to alter their distinctive character.
2. A. undertook to supply B. with certain parcels of linseed, which he warranted
should be "Calcutta linseed," and supplied him with linseed containing 15 per
cent. of other seeds. It was proved that "Calcutta linseed," at the time the contract was made, contained usually from 2 to 3 per cent. of other seeds. The jury
were asked whether this was such an adulteration or admixture of foreign substances as to alter the distinctive character of the article, and prevent its being
saleable as Calcutta linseed; and whether this adulteration was such as might
reasonably be expected :-.Ield, no misdirection.

The first count of the declaration stated, that the defendant
agreed to sell to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff agreed to buy of the
defendant, certain parcels of goods, and by the said agreement the
defendant warranted the said goods respectively to be " Calcutta
linseed"; that the defendant caused to be delivered to the plaintiff
the said parcels of goods, but that he broke his said warranty in
this, that the said parcels so delivered were not Calcutta linseed,
and were respectively in great part composed of substances other
than and inferior in value to Calcutta linseed, and the defendant
never delivered to the plaintiff parcels of Calcutta linseed in pursuance of his said contract and warranty; and by reason of the premises part of the said goods so delivered were wholly valueless to
and unsaleable by the plaintiff, and as to and in respect of the residue thereof the plaintiff was unable to obtain the same prices as he
otherwise would have done, and was obliged to and- did, before the
suit, sell the same at greatly reduced prices. The declaration contained also the common money counts.
Pleas to the first count-first, a denial of the warranty as alleged;
second, a denial of the breaches of contract as alleged. Issue
thereon.
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At the trial, before Jervis, 0. J., at the Guildhall, at the sittings
after last Michaelmas term, it was proved that the sale was not by
sample, and 'that 15 per cent. of the parcels of linseed delivered was
inustard, and that from 2 to'3 per cent. was the usual amount of
adulteration found in Calcutta linseed, but that thelinseed supplied
answered the description of Calcutta linseed. "Two of the plaintiff's
witnesses said,-that it was linseed of an inferior quality ; and two
of the defendant's witnesses, to whom it was sold as Calcutta linseed,
used it, and made cake of it. The Lord Chief Justice left it to the
jury to say, "1whether there was such an adulteration or admixture
of foreign substances as to alter the distinctive character of the
article, and to prevent its being saleable as Calcutta linseed; and
whether the adulteration was such as might reasonably be expected."
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the first count, and
the amount of damages was referred to arbitration.
M. Smith now moved for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection. The action is for a breach of warranty. If the linseed supplied by the defendant was of the description (and it was proved
that it was) known in the trade as " Calcutta linseed," there is no
breach. The sale was not by sample. It was never intended that
there should be any question as to the quality of the linseed, but it
was to be taken "tale quale." It is submitted, that "the reasonable
expectation" of the purchaser is not the true test. All that the
purchaser under this contract had any right to expect was, that the
article should be saleable in the market as Calcutta linseed. He
referred to (ardiner vs. Gray, 4 Campb. 144.
CRESSWELL, J.-I cannot discover any misdirection. It is suggested that the misdirection was in asking the jury whcther the
seed came with more foreign in it than was expected-and that the
question ought to have been simply, whether it was or was not Calcutta linseed. But all that the Lord Chief Justice meant to asli
was, whether the article was such as was usually known as Caleutta
linseed; because, if it were, then the purchaser would have a right
to expect a reasonable amount of adulteration only.
CROWDER, J.-I also think that the question was quitecorrectly
left to the jury:-" 'Was the adulteration more than might reason-
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ably be expected ?" These words are not to be understood in the
sense put upon them by Mr. Montagu Smith. The jury found that
the adulteration was not reasonable, and the Chief Justice is satisfied with the verdict.
WILLES, J.-In effect, the question left to the jury was, "Was
the linseed so mixed as to have lost its distinctive character ?" If
it was so mixed, the defendant was answerable for a breach of his
contract. The purchaser's expectation was, that he would get Calcutta linseed of the quality known in the trade as Calcutta linseed.
In this case he did not get what he bargained for. As if a man
buys gold, bargaining for it to be of 24 carats of fineness, and he
gets gold of one carat of fineness, no one can say that he has got
what he bargained for.
JERVIS, C. J. concurred.
Rule refused.

In the Court of Exchequer-Tanuary 16, 1856.
DAVIES VS. ROPER.'

In a case involving no question of law the plaintiff's claim was supported almost
exclusively by his own testimony, and was encountered by circumstantial evidence
on the part of the defendant. A common jury having found for the plaintiff, a
new trial was granted on affidavits disclosing fresh evidence. At the second trial,
this evidence was adduced, but the second jury (a special one) found for the
plaintiff. The judge certifying to the court in writing that the verdict was "a
very wrong verdict," the court granted a third trial, on the ground of its being
against the weight of evidence.

This was an action for an illegal distress for rent, to which the
defence was that the distress was lawful. The plaintiff, a poor man,
had built a cottage on some waste land, and occupied it for several
years; at the end of which time the defendant, a gentleman of fortune in the neighborhood, made the distress in question upon that
land, on the ground that the plaintiff was his tenant, and had on
former occasions paid rent to him for it. The cause was tried at
Chester, before Williams, J., and a common jury, when a verdic
I London Jurist, vol. 20, p. 167.
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was returned for the plaintiff. A rule was obtained to set aside
this verdict as being against the weight of evidence, and on affidavits
disclosing fresh evidence, which, after argument, was made absolute
on the latter ground. The cause was tried a second time at the
same place, before Jervis, 0. J., and a special jury, when, notwithstanding this additional evidence, another verdict was found for the
plaintiff. No question of law arose on either trial, the question at
each simply being whether the plaintiff was a free occupier of the
land in dispute, or held it as tenant to the defendant. The plaintiff's
case on both occasions was supported almost exclusively by his own
testimony; and was encountered on the part of the defendant by a
mass of circumstantial evidence, consisting chiefly of statements at
variance with it made by the plaintiff in the course of conversation
with different persons. A rule was obtained to set aside this second
verdict as against the weight of evidence, Jervis, 0. J., on being
applied to, certifying to the court in writing that the verdict was
"a very wrong verdict."
G-rove and -E. 7. Williams showed cause. Independently of the
merits of this case, it raises an important constitutional questionwhether, when two successive juries have found in favor of a litigant
party on a mere question of conflicting testimony, with no matter
of law involved, the court will set aside the second verdict because
they deem it erroneous. The true principle on this subject is that
stated in Wood vs. Gunston, (Sty. 466), "1The discretion of the
court to grant a new trial must bo a judicial and not an arbitrary
discretion." And in a case in the Queen's Bench, where the judge
of a county court had granted several new trials, the court said he
was wrong. [iA aIT B.-Did you ever know an instance of the
court having refused a new trial where the judge who tried the
cause certified the verdict to be a very wrong one ?] Frequently,
when the application was for a second new trial. [IMARTIN, B.-I
never knew such an instance when the judge took the trouble of
writing it down, as he has done here.] If parties are concluded by
the mere opinion of the judge upon the evidence, trial by jury is at
an end, and trial by judge substituted for it. [PLATT, B.-The
reference which the court makes to the judge by whom the cause
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is tried, is merely to inform their own conscience.] Will the court,
then, grant new trials ad infinitum if the several successive judges
by whom the cause is tried pronounce the several successive verdicts

erroneoug ? [ALDERSON, B.-It is not correct, to speak of the two
verdicts in this case as similar, for fresh evidence was brought before
the second jury.] No two verdicts can ever proceed on exactly
.- If this ease had arisen under
the same evidence. [AILDERSON-,
not be cxamined, you would
parties
could
the old system, when the
have had no witness at all. A man may now swear himself into an
estate; besides which, the evidence of the plaintiff here is opposed
by contrary testimo.y.] None contradicting him directly. [They
likewise argued the cafse on its merits.]
Welsby, who appcarel to support the rule, was not called on.
ALDEP.So-, B.-There must be a third trial-that is all. The
case is not like the one we had this morning, where the judge merely
reported that lie should not have found as the jury did. Here we
have the opinion of the judge, who saw the witnesses, and knows all
the circumstances of the case better than we can, that the verdict is
a very wrong verdict.
PLATT, B.-Tho judge by whom the cause is tried hears the
addresses of counsel to the jury, who often form their opinion on
topics add-esed to their prejudice, such as one of the parties being
a poor man and his antagonist a rich one. That is just this case.
MARTIN-, B.-I believe judges are most careful not to interfere
with the verdicts of juries, but if a verdict is to stand when the
judge says it is a very wrong verdict, trial by. jury will become a
great evil.
The rule was then made absolute, costs to abide the event. 1
This case, so trivial in itself, has been reported for the sake of the constiThe question divides itself into two parts-first,
whether previous to the Evidence Act, 14 & 1-5Vict. c. 99, the courts would set
tutional principle it involves.

aside an indefinite series of verdicts given on a disputed fact, if the judges by whom
the cause was tried expressed their opinion, either verbally or by writing, that those
verdicts were very wrong ones; and, secondly whether any change in this respect
has been effected by that statute. Where, indeed, a jury find what is called a
"perverse verdict," i. e. refuse to listen to the law as correctly laid down to them by
vs. Grffghs, 8 Jur 1010; per Pollock, C. B., in
the judgz, (per Parke. B , in .,fauld
Saunders vs. Davies, 10 Jur. 481), a new trial is grantable ex debito justitim; and if
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any possible number of successive juries were to find in the same way, the verdicts
would be set aside, for in such cases the jury overstep their province and invade
that of the judge. And the same holds where a jury, or series of juries, disregard
a prfsumptio juris, i. e. a presumption of law which might be made by the court
without their intervention; (1 Ph. Ev. 467, 10th ed.); for presumptions of this class
are part of the law itself. So if they take on themselves to find a verdict where
the judge tells them truly that there is no evidence, for whether there is any evidence
is a question for him: (1 Ph. Ev. 3, 4: 10th cd.) But where a jury disregard a
presumption of mixed law and fact, and a fortiori where they find in a particular
way on a mere question of conflicting testimony, all the authorities agree, and the
35th section of the Common-Law Procedure Act, 1854, recognizes, that the granting
i new trial is only matter for the discretion of the courts, which are moreover very
cautious in the exercise of this power: (See Ph. & Am. Ev. 459, 460; Stark. Ev.
803, 4th ed. ; Swinnerton vs. The 3l1arquiv of SLafford, 3 Taunt. 232; Po.3tervs. Allenby,
5 Dowl. 619). A strong illustration is afforded by the case of Foster vs. Steele,
(3 Bin g. N. C. 892). There two successive juries having found for the plaintiff on
the question of the seaworthiness of a ship, the court of common pleas, though
dissatisfied with the verdicts, was equally divided as to whether a third trial should
be granted: Tindal, C. J., and Park, 3., holding the negative, and Vaughan and
Coltman, JJ., the affirmative; but the whole court agreed that if a third jury were
to find in the same way the proceedings should stop. The disregard by a jury of a
presumption of mixed law and fact, affords much stronger ground for the interference
of the court than where the question is only one of conflicting evidence, and we
apprehend that the principle on which new trials are granted at all in the latter
case is this-that although the jury are the constitutional judges of the facts in
dispute, still if thei- verdict appears against the weight of the evidence, the court
will presume that they have labored under some mistake or misapprehension, or
been carried away by some prejudice, or influenced by some corrupt motive which
cannot be detected, and in order to prevent a defeat of justice from any of these
unascertained sources, sends the case to another jury. The reference usually made
on such occasions to the judge by whom the cause was tried, for his judgment on
the evidence, is merely, as observed by Platt, B., in the text, to inform the conscience
of the court. But when a succession of juries find in the same way, not only would
such a presumption be violent and unreasonable, but the very fact raises a presumption of an opposite kind, namely, that there must have been some ground for
those findings which escaped the observation of the presiding judges; e. g. that the
juries remembered some piece of evidence which the judges forgot, or saw something
in the demeanour of the witnesses which eluded their observation-twenty-four eyes
see more than two, especially when those two are already occupied in making a note.
We once saw five men tried for a burglary, before a very accurate and painstaking
judge, who summed up for a conviction as to three, and for an acquittal as to the
fourth, ind directed an acquittal of the fifth. The jury convicted all five, and
being remonstrated with by the judge, it came out on inquiry that their verdict
against the fourth-and fifth prisoners was found on a piece of evidence affecting them,

